
Job market paper
School Selectivity Decisions and Discrimination
I develop a model of a profit-maximizing school which designs an admissions test and sets tuition in an environment where the value of an education (to a potential student) is a function of the information carried by their admissions status. I then apply the basic structure of that model to investigate the school’s incentive to apply discrimination or affirmative action when workers are characterized by a notion of diversity which is correlated with ability to pay tuition but uncorrelated with labor market productivity. I show how the school may optimally discriminate in admissions or pricing under various restrictions on discrimination.
Fields
Search and matching, Information theoryContact information
- estoniablack@gmail.com
- (865) 274-6540
- CV
- Gardner Hall CB 3305
- University of North Carolina
- Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305
Letter writers
- Peter Norman
- Fei Li
- Can Tian
- Michelle Sheran-Andrews