

Syllabus 846

Fall 2019

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Grade Assessment. Your grade will be based on a paper due on the last day of class. As you know, the field requirement for industrial organization is a paper. The paper for this class ideally will be a springboard for your field requirement. The paper will consist of a brief review of the literature, a model, and some basic results of the model. All students will present an article in class; this should be related to your paper topic. I will be happy to go over specific papers to examine and present in class.

I will tell you what papers that we will cover each week. You are expected to have read the papers before class. At the start of each class, I will randomly ask one of you to give a five-minute synopsis of the paper that we will discuss. This is to induce you to be familiar with the paper that will be discussed in class to enable you to both understand the paper better and how the model works.

#### General References

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#### Abbreviations

AER *American Economic Review*

BJE *Bell Journal of Economics*

RAND *RAND Journal of Economics*

RESTUD *Review of Economic Studies*

JPE *Journal of Political Economy*

Econometrica *Econometrica*

JEMS *Journal of Economics Management and Strategy*

JLEO *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*

JPUBE *Journal of Public Economics*

JLE *Journal of Law and Economics*

JRE *Journal of Regulatory Economics*

IJIO *International Journal of Industrial Organization*

QJE *Quarterly Journal of Economics*

EJ *Economic Journal*

A. Standard IO Product Markets Models and Traditional Frameworks

\*Tirole Chapters 5 and 7

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B. Price discrimination and Product Differentiation

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C. Bundling and Tying

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\*Carlton, Gans, and Waldman, "Why Tie a Product Consumers do not Use," *AEJ Micro*, 2010, 85-105.

#### D. Product Selection, Quality, and Advertising

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#### E. Vertical Control, Foreclosure, and Conditional Pricing

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F. Models with Switching Costs and Network Externalities

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## H. Search and Industrial Organization

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