Grade Assessment. Your grade will be based on a paper due on the last day of class. As you know, the field requirement for industrial organization is a paper. The paper for this class ideally will be a springboard for your field requirement. The paper will consist of a brief review of the literature, a model, and some basic results of the model. All students will present an article in class; this should be related to your paper topic. I will be happy to go over specific papers to examine and present in class.

I will tell you what papers that we will cover each week. You are expected to have read the papers before class. At the start of each class, I will randomly ask one of you to give a five minute synopsis of the paper that we will discuss. This is to induce to be familiar with the paper that will be discussed in class to enable to both understand the paper better and how the model works.

General References
Bolton and Dewatripont, Contract Theory, MIT (2005) (B-D)
Laffont and Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT, 1993. (L-T)
Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization.

Abbreviations
AER American Economic Review
BJE Bell Journal of Economics
RAND RAND Journal of Economics
RESTUD Review of Economic Studies
JPE Journal of Political Economy
Emetrica Econometrica
JEMS Journal of Economics Management and Strategy
JLEO Journal of Law Economics and Organization
JPUBE Journal of Public Economics
JLE Journal of Law and Economics
JRE Journal of Regulatory Economics
IJIO International Journal of Industrial Organization
QJE Quarterly Journal of Economics
EJ Economic Journal
A. Standard IO Product Markets Models and Traditional Frameworks
*Tirole Chapters 5 and 7

B. Price discrimination and Product Differentiation
*Tirole Chapter 3
*B-D Chapter 6.
*Stole, “Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition,” Handbook of IO vol. 3.
Johnson and Myatt (2003), "Multiproduct quality competition: Fighting brands and product line pruning,” AER 93.3 748-774.

C. Bundling and Tying

*Chen and Rey (2012),”Loss Leading as an Exploitive Device,” AER, 3462-3482.


D. Product Selection, Quality, and Advertising

*Tirole 95-129, Chapter 2


and “Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection,” JEMS, 1999, 1-32.


Taylor (1995),”Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures," JPE


E. Vertical Control, Foreclosure, and Conditional Pricing

*Tirole Chapters 4 and 8.


*Bedre-Defolie and Biglaiser (2017), “Contracts as a barrier to entry when buyers are non-pivotal” AER, 2041-2071.

Chone and Linnemer (2014, 2016), “Nonlinear pricing and exclusion” RAND.
Segal and Whinston, Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,” *Econometrica*, 71(3), May 2003, pp. 757-791


*Segal and Whinston, 2000 “Naked Exclusion- Comment” *AER*, 296-309.


*Calzolari and Denicolo 2015 “Exclusive contracts and market dominance” AER 3321–3351.

*—— and _____ 2013 “Competition with exclusive contracts and market-share discounts” AER, 2384-2411

F. Models with Switching Costs and Network Externalities


G. Two-Sided Markets


H. Search and Industrial Organization


