
Job market paper
Government Choice of Intellectual Property Rights Protection
This paper proposes a general model of a government's choice of intellectual property rights protection given the structure of the import market, the distribution of consumer incomes, and the preferences of the government. It also presents local government autonomy as a possible explanation for divergence of de facto protection from formal protection. A case study of the pharmaceutical industry in Jordan is used to motivate the model, and measures of de facto and formal intellectual property rights protection are used to test the implications of the model.
Fields
24, 20, International political economy, International trade, Applied microeconomic theoryContact information
- winstona@live.unc.edu
- CV
- Gardner Hall CB 3305
- University of North Carolina
- Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305
Letter writers
- Gary Biglaiser
- Timothy McKeown
- Simon Alder
- Kyle Woodward
- Michelle Sheran-Andrews